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SYMPOSIUM: LAW AND RELIGION
PART ONE OF TWO
KEYNOTE
THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF RELIGION AND THE
CONSCIOUSNESS OF LAW, WITH SOME
IMPLICATIONS FOR DIALOGUE
Howard Lesnick'
'Just then a lawyer stood up to testJesus.,,1
So begins Luke's accoune of a most extraordinary intra-
religious dialogue, full of meaning for our understanding of religion,
of law, of the relation between them, and. of dialogue itself.
I.
"Teacher," the lawyer began, "what must I do to inherit eternal
life?,,3
Jesus answered with a question of his own: "What is written in the
law? What do you read there?" The lawyer's response, because it is so
familiar to Christians as the "love commandments"-''You shall love
the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and
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3 A half-millennium earlier, with different words, in a different tone, and in a very different
culture, Socrates spoke fervently to the centrality of just such a question in these words: "The
subject we are discussing is one which cannot fail to engage the earnest attention even of a man
of small intelligence; it is nothing less than how a man should live." PLATO, GORGIAS *500C.
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with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your neighbor as
yourself'4-m ight at first appear less arresting than it is, for it is easy
to forget that he is quoting a central passage from Deuteronoml and a
line from the Holiness Code of Leviticus,6 and that as an account of
"what is written in the law" his response is most selective. Would we
not expect of "an expert in the law of Moses,,7 that he respond more
prescriptively? For example, do no work on the sabbath;8 do not call
on the name of God in vain;9 make an offering in the temple on the
three festivals;lo do not boil a kid in its mother's milk;11 refrain from
sexual relations for seven days following the onset of your wife's men-
strual periods.
12
When Moses put to the people the ~uestion, "Now
then, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you?," 3 he began his
response saying you must "only" fear, love, and serve God, but he
nonetheless immediately added, and "keep the commandments of
the Lord your God and his decrees that I am commanding you to-
day."14 Matthew Berke, writing what he titled A Jewish Appreciation of
Catholic Social Teaching, describes the developed traditions of both Ju-
daism and Catholicism as seeing morality as involving "not just an ul-
timate ideal or aim but a system of specific rules and prohibitions
that ... taken as a whole over the long run, not only lead to, but
themselves constitute, a good life.,,15 The lawyer appears to have re-
sponded more as he believed Jesus would have/ 6 than as he likely be-
lieved himself.
When Jesus assured him, ''You have given the right answer; do
this, and you will live." The lawyer, "wanting to justify himself," re-
plied, "And who is my neighbor?" At that point Jesus recounted the
Parable of the Good Samaritan, who came upon a man stripped and
badly beaten by a band of robbers on the road from Jerusalem to
Jericho. Two of his fellow countrymen had not stopped, perhaps for
4 Luke 10:27.
5 Deuteronomy 6:5.
6 Leviticus 19: 18.
7 The term that many versions translate as "lawyer" is thus elucidated in THE BIBLE 117 n.25
(New Testament pagination) (New Oxford Annotated Edition 3d ed. 2001).
8 Exodus 20:10.
9 Exodus 20:7.





15 Matthew Berke, A Jewish Appreciation of Catholic Social Teaching, in CATHOLICISM,
LIBERALISM & COMMUNITARIANISM: THE CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL TRADITION At'lD THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY 235, 239 (Kenneth L. Grasso eta!. eds., 1995).
16 See Mark 12:28-31; Matthew 22:36-40.
good reason,17 to give aid, but the Samaritan bandaged his wounds,
cared for his animals, took him to an inn, and paid for his room and
board. Jesus asked, "Which of these three, do you think, was a
neighbor to the man?" "The one who showed him mercy," answered
the lawyer, to which Jesus responded, "Go and do likewise."
Recognizing the sensitivity of the matter for some Christians, and
for manyJews, I would like to go back over this conversation for what
we can learn from attending to what its participants did not say at
each of their turns. For I believe that choices were made at each step
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II.
I propose to do that, however, In counterpoint with some
thoughts about choices in the ways we think about religion, and
about law, and about the parallels between the two domains.
What Robert Cover famously said of Judaism-" [t] he basic word
ofJudaism is obligation"18-holds, I believe, across a spectrum of reli-
gious traditions, and applies in the domain of secular law as well. If
the cosmic or the social order obligates, and does not merely
threaten overweening force/ 9 the contested question is, how?
I have suggested elsewhere that there is an ancient and enduring
tension between two paradigmatic explanations of how religion and
law each obligate, and an ancient and enduring connection between
each explanation regarding religion and its counterpart in law.20 I
will look first at religion.
The "default" position-now and earlier the most widely held,
treated often as simply axiomatic or definitional-understands God
as transcendent and sovereign, the "Supreme Being,"21 "the King of
17 The Priest and the Levite were traveling from Jerusalem, perhaps after having purified
themselves at the Temple, and touching the victim, "left half dead," Luke 10:30, would have sub-
jected them to the hazard of "defilement." See Leviticus 21:11 ("The priest ... shall not go near
where there is a dead body."); see also J. David Bleich, Kohanim and Flights Leaving Israel, 36
TRADITION 64 (2002) (discussing how kohani~thepriestly class of Jews descendant from the
Biblical Aaron-are forbidden to come in contact with a dying person or corpse).
18 Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & REUGIO 65,
66 (1987).
19 For a classic articulation of the distinction between having an obligation, rooted in moral-
ity, and "feeling obliged," rooted only in prudence in the face of the power to harm, see H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 82-85 (Oxford 1994).
20 See HOWARD LESNICK, LISTENING FOR GOD: RELICION AND MORAL DISCERNMENT 132-57
(Fordham 1998) [hereinafter LESNICK, LISTENING FOR GOD]; Howard Lesnick, 'He Religious
Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1469,1473-78 (1998).
21 Congress defined "religious belief' in the selective-service law as, "belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." See United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 172 (1965).




the kings of kings,"22 who spoke the world into existence23 and consti-
tuted morality by "His Word.,,24 The words of the Hebrew Bible are
saturated with this consciousness. It typically includes an understand-
ing of God as always able to and at times choosing to intervene pur-
posefully in human history, and as bestowing rewards and punish-
ments, in this life or the next, on those who do or fail to do "His
Will."
Typically, but not always. What to me is most "core" about the
dominant paradigm is its focus on the otherness and inexorability of "di-
vine commands," rather than on either their methods of enforce-
ment or their origin in an exercise of divine volition. The matter
now appears to me less as a dichotomy than as a continuing qualifica-
tion of the "default" position, part by part, until (much as in an
Escher painting) a qualitatively different conception comes to be ar-
25ticulated.
One such qualification challenges the emphasis on reward and
punishment. So traditional a believer as C. S. Lewis termed such a
"preoccupation" a "corrupt[ion]" of religion. 26 Although he indeed
spoke of commands, he described them as:
inexorable, but they were backed by no "sanctions." God was to be
obeyed simply because he was God. Long since ... He had taught me
22 SeeJOSEPH H. HERTZ, THE AUTHORIZED DAILY PRAYER BOOK 209 n.5 (rev. ed. 1960). The
ruler of Persia was accorded the title, "[K]ing of [K]ings."
t~1 "Then God said, 'Let there be light;' and there was light." Genesis 1:3.
24 The Revelation of the "Ten Utterances" at Sinai, Exodus 20:1-17, is the most obvious ex-
ample. Having such an ability is, in this consciousness, what it means to be "God." See Art Leffs
celebrated description of a God-grounded moral order: "God, for philosophical purposes, is
uniquely in the universe that being whose every pronouncement, including evaluative ones, is a
'performative utterance' ... [, that is,] a statement that does not describe facts or conform to
them but instead constitutes them, creates them, 'performs' them." Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeak-
able Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE LJ. 1229, 1231.
Neither Lefrs language nor mine should be read as taking a position in the "old debate"
that Michael Moore identifies in these terms: "whether the consummate goodness of God con-
sists in the fact that whatever God commands is good (because she commands it), or whether
that goodness consists in the fact that God, being omniscient, makes no mistakes about what is
good in her commandings." Michael S. Moore, Inte?preting Interpretation, in LAw A!'\lD
INTERPRETATION 1,8 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995). In personal correspondence, Robert Rodes
speaks in similar terms, referring to "an old tension between the view that God's will is prior to
His intellect, and ... the prevailing view [that] gives pre-eminence to God's intellect." Letter
from Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Professor of Legal Ethics, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., to author
Gan. 11,2005) (on file with author). Perhaps the oldest version of this question is Plato's: "Is
what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?" Plato,
EuthyphTO, in THE COLLECrED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 169, 178 (Huntington Cairns & Edith Ham-
ilton eds., 1978).
25 See, e.g., M.e. Escher, Liberation (1955), in which a scene of a sky, picking up white birds
flying in one direction against a black background, changes gradually into one of black birds
flying in the other direction against a white background, and finally into vaguely geometric
shapes.
2<; C. S. LEWIS, SURPRISED ByJOY: THE SHAPE OF My EARLY LIFE 231 (1956).
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how a thing can be revered not for what it can do to us but for what it
is .... If you ask why we should obey God, in the last resort the answer is,
"I am.,,27
A related partial departure challenges the analogy to a willed (at
times read, willful) act of a temporal sovereign. It understands the
"command" of God as "the eternal law, ... part of the very being of
God, rather than something merely willed by Him for arbitrary or
contingent reasons.,,28 On such a view, "ethical requirements bind
h . b h ,,29t e conscIence ecause t ey are true.
This formulation preserves the idea of divine law as supreme, in
that sense ruling over humanity. Yet note the critical role of what I
will call moral discernment as the basis for moral norms. Writing of
Catholic teaching, Joseph Boyle observes:
[M] oral norms are not ... arbitrary impositions by God. Theyare ... the
demands of our own rational natures.... [M] orality is ... [the effort] by
rational creatures ... [to] guide their lives to what is genuinely good.
Thus, the reason which provides the basis for moral norms is a person's
own reason, not something alien or imposed.
30
A consciousness that can speak of "the demands of our own rational
natures" departs in significant ways from a command consciousness,
which would have difficulty seeing a self-generated call as a demand. 3]
The departure is limited, however, by the emphasis on reason as the
basis of an internally generated source of moral discernment, for the
strictures of reason are a set of norms common to the species, only in
that sense "a person's own."
But two celebrated passages in the Hebrew Scriptures contain at
least the seeds of a different view of the relation between God and
humanity with respect to the moral law. Moses himself, while speak-
ing explicitly of God's word in the language of command, reassured
the People of Israel in terms that went significantly beyond it:
Surely, this commandment that I am commanding you today is not too
hard, nor is it too far away. It is not in heaven, that you should say, "Who
will go up to heaven for us, and get it for us so that we may hear it and
observe it?" Neither is it beyond the sea, that you should say, "Who will
cross to the other side of the sea for us, and get it for us so that we may
hear it and observe it?" No, the word is very near to you; it is in your
mouth and in your heart for you to observe.
32
27 Id.
28 Richard Stith, Images, Spirituality, and Law, 10 lL. & RELIGION 33, 43 (1993-94) (attribut-
ing this understanding to St. Thomas Aquinas).
29 Berke, supra note 15, at 239.
30 Joseph Boyle, Duties to Others in Roman Catholic Thought, in DUTIES TO OTHERS 73, 84
(Courtney S. Campbell & B. Andrew Lustig eds., 1994).
31 See LESNICK, LISTENING FOR GOD, supra note 20, at 3-4.
32 Deuteronomy 30:11-14.




By "the word," I understand, Torah. Susan Handleman describes
rabbinic thought as naming the Torah as '''the Wisdom that preexists
the world. ",33 Drawing on the rabbinic teaching that "God consulted
the Torah and created the world," she finds in the Jewish tradition a
basis for regarding the Torah as "a blueprint for the architecture of
creation; ... not simply ... a set of prescriptive laws, but the primor-
dial design of the world.,,34 But if the word is in our hearts, the tem-
plate that exists in the world, by which the world and its moral order
came to be created, is mirrored within each person. It may have been
given to us from outside, but in the sense of being implanted within
us, of being an attribute of our creation.35
A prophecy ofJeremiah expresses the thought that "God's will" is
part of our own being in even more far-reaching words:
But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after
those days, says the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it
on their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. No
longer need they teach one another, or say to each other, "Know the
Lord," for they shall all know me ....36
These Scriptural words can perhaps be read as viewing the "inter-
nal" aspect of the search for. the will of God as limited to the use of a
person's (God-given) powers of reason. However, they also contain
expressions of a consciousness that crosses the line between simply a
significant variation on the traditional approach and a fundamental
departure from it. The translator of the Soncino edition of Jeremiah
interprets the prophecy that God will put the law on the hearts of the
people in these words: "I will no longer be something external to
them, but so deeply ingrained in their consciousness as to be part of
33 Susan Handleman, Emunah: The Craft ofFaith, CROSS CURRENTS, Fall 1992, at 292, 303.
34 Id. The resonance of the Catholic sources quoted above, in the text accompanying foot-
notes 29 and 30, with this image is palpable.
The term "the Word" (now capitalized) appears most famously in the opening lines of the
Gospel ofJohn-"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word
was God" (John 1: I)-and it is striking that Christian theologian John Cobb says of it what Han-
dleman says of Torah. SeeJohn B. Cobb, Jr., Toward a Christocentric Catholic Theology, in TOWARD
A UNIVERSAL THEOLOGY OF RELIGION 86, 88 (Leonard Swidler ed., 1987) (proposing that, "de-
spite the predominance of 'Word' in the tradition, we speak today of 'Wisdom' ... The Wis-
dom ... that is present everywhere and at all times").
35 One of the most beautiful expressions of this insight of which I am aware has a source
hardly thought of as religious, yet imperfectly categorized as "secular":
A strange mystery it is that nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of
her ... hurryjngs through the abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child, subject
still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capac-
ity ofjudging all the works of his unthinking mother.
Bertrand Russell, A Free Man's Worship, in WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN 104, 107 (Paul Edwards
ed., 1957).
36 jeremiah 31:33-34.












them.,,37 Though Torah be thought so transcendent as to pre-exist
creation itself, our understanding of it is transformed by thinking of
it as Wisdom, written in our hearts. "Obedience" then becomes an
active, creative practice; in "submitting" to the will of God, we first
search for the voice to which we will submit. Discernment of it re-
quires our fullest creative participation-a process that will often re-
quire but not be limited to analytic rationality-and to obey is not so
much to yield our will to a superior force as to align our actions with
that within us which is most holy, most our birthright as both crea-
ture and co-creator.
In place of an exclusive emphasis on notions of hierarchy and
submission (even to "reason"), these expressions embody a concep-
tion of the divine/human interaction driven by themes of active per-
sonal searching for sincere discernment of God's will, and of recipro-
cal love. Emily Hartigan, my sometime teaching partner and long-
time intellectual and spiritual mentor, has written of a feminist spiri-
tuality that experiences the law of God as "a gentle draw, more than a
compelling force, an invitation more than a command ... [, an]
'ought' that beckons more deeply than it threatens.,,38 Robert Bolt
understood the matter so when he had h.is Sir Thomas More respond
to his daughter's heartfelt appeal, "Haven't you done as much as God
can reasonably want?:" "[F] inally ... it isn't a matter of reason; finally
it's a matter of love.,,39
III.
Let me return to Luke's dialogue. Countering the lawyer's initial
question ("What must I do ... ?") with one asking, "What is written in
the law?," Jesus's inquiry seemed to invite a response that would fit
comfortably within the lawyer's presumably traditional conception of
the likely source of an answer. The lawyer's answer, I have suggested,
appears, however, to have been less what he believed than what he
thought Jesus was preaching-to be found in Scripture, to be sure,
but not singled out there nor thought to be at all sufficient. Perhaps
the lawyer, "wanting to test Jesus," sought to commit him to a re-
sponse, so that he could challenge it, rather than setting himself up
to be the defender of his own more candid answer.
When Jesus appeared to "fall for it," and simply said, "do this and
you shall live," the lawyer pounced: "Who is my neighbor?"
37 Jeremiah 31:32 & n.32, at 211 (A. Cohen ed., H. Freedman trans., Soncino Press 3d ed.
1961) .
38 Emily Fowler Hartigan, The Power of Lanr;uage Beyond Words: Law as Invitation, 26 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 67, 89 (1991).
39 ROBERT BOLT, A MAt'! FOR ALL SEASONS 141 (1990).
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Now the issue seemed truly joined. The premise of this very
lawyerly response was the idea, simple common sense in our world,
that the law constrains us in our default-position pursuit of self-
interest, such that, when we hear a rule that we must follow, our only
obligation is to respect its boundaries. 4o A law with an undefined cru-
cial term has told me little; the task of "definition" is one of exegesis
of the text. 41
jesus's interest, however, was not in exegesis. He sought to chal-
lenge the lawyer's premise, that outside the scope of obligation I am
free to respond (to "love") or not, as I choose. Suppose Jesus had
simplysaid that. To put it as you or I might have done, it might read
like this: ''You know, you are proceeding from a flawed ethical prem-
ise, that law apart we owe one another nothing. Yes, we are 'obli-
gated' to love one another, but the obligation is not a constraint on
our will, to be accepted only if within the scope of the mandate.
Rather, it is to recognize and take the opportunity that our being
gives us to love the other. We can expand the range of this power to
embrace all with whom we come in contact, transcending boundaries
of ethnicity and religion and overflowing the day-to-day 'important'
priorities that divert us (as they did the priest and the Levite42 ) from
responding to another's need~ The opportunity to define the term,
'neighbor', by our conduct, which by the spirit of your question en-
ables us to see in it a legitimation of indifference to those not closest
to us, invites us also to embrace wholeheartedly the norm expressed
,by the law, expanding its reach and expanding thereby our congru-
ence with the contours of our creation."
After such a response, they might have had an interesting phi-
losophical-religious discussion, as we might today ifwe were to debate
such questions as the "duty to rescue" or the act/omission dichotomls
in the law, the existence of an ethical "duty to reach beyond duty," 3
10 See Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People ofFaith, in CHRlSTlA
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 5, 14 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
4\ Over the next few centuries, the rabbis developed, and still follow today, a complex juris-
prudence aimed at seeking to know God's will through the penetration of the meaning of un-
defined terms in Scripture. Any Jew wanting to know today, "Who is my neighbor?", as that
phrase appears in Torah, may not simply choose the narrowest plausible meaning and, comply-
ing with it, do as he pleases. Nor is he free simply to consult his own moral sense. See infra note
57. At the least, he has some conscientious homework to do. See, e.g., ABRAHAM COHEN,
EVERYMAN'S TALMUD 212-16 (1949) (discussing differing interpretations of Torah passages,
specifically the meanings given "neighbor," "enemy," and "fellow man").
42 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
4~ See Heidi Hurd, Duties Beyond the Call ofDuty, 6 JAHRBUCH FOR RECHT UND ETHIK 3, 3-39
(1998) (offering an imaginative analysis, from a secular perspective, of the question whether
there is a moral obligation to reach beyond moral obligation); Aharon Lichtenstein, Does Jewish
Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakha?, in MODERN JEWISH ETHICS 62, 81 (Marvin
Fox ed., 1975) (concluding that we are commanded to "aspire").
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or some similar conundrum. Jesus might have "won" such an argu-
ment, in the sense that most of those listening might have been per-
suaded by his statement. Perhaps. It is far less likely that he would
have won over his debate partner, who (you recall) did not inquire
out of genuine puzzlement but to "test" Jesus, to 'Justify" himself.
What Jesus did was to reach under the argument, and under the
lawyer's motivation, to a quality that the lawyer had not exhibited,
and that most of us would have doubted that he had, to tap a capacity
for empathy that Jesus perceived was capable of guiding his moral
judgment. Like Nathan before him, he told a story.44 And the lawyer
did not keep his grip on his analytic powers and object to the rele-
vance of the Parable, as any good lawyer might have, as glibly shifting
the question from, "To whom am I obligated to act as a neighbor?,"
to, "What does it mean to act as a neighbor?" For the moment at
least, he was unable to hold onto his premise, that I am free to
choose not to be a neighbor to anyone who is not already "my
neighbor;" unable also simply to allow the "sterner" part of his char-
acter to lead him to shrug off the question as therefore of no concern
to him. He quietly answered Jesus's question: "The one who showed
him mercy." As the listeners to the dialogue may have been, he was
left in the power of his own moral sense, the existence and latent
power of which Jesus presumed and, by his story, brought to the sur-
face.
Jesus did what, sixteen centuries later, George Fox, the founder of
the Religious Society of Friends, charged his followers to do in their
own lives: "[W] alk cheerfully over the world, answering that of God
in every one.,,45 Jesus not only saw "that of God," an authentic reso-
nance with the "gentle draw" of the moral law,46 in one who had not
exhibited any such thing, who perhaps would have denied any such
"softness," but he spoke to that aspect of the lawyer in a manner cal-
culated to bring it to his awareness, not as something imposed on
him but as something recognized as part of him. At least for the
moment, he was changed.
The point is not that Jesus's approach was more likely to be effec-
tive in altering the lawyer's own consciousness. It proceeds from a
fundamentally different response to the moral frailty of human be-
ings, the influence of which is not to be held at bay only through in-
44 In the Book of Samuel, Nathan leads David to condemn David's own act of arranging to
send Uriah, the husband of Bathsheba, into battle in circumstances where Uriah would be
killed. 2 Samuel 12:1-15.
45 This famous admonition appears in a letter that Fox wrote in 1656 while in prison. Letter
from George Fox (1656), quoted in QUAKER FAITH & PRACTICE: THE BOOK OF CHRISTIAN
DISCIPLINE OF THE YEARLY MEETING OF THE RELIGIOCS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS (QUAKERS) IN
BRITAIN, ch. 19.32 (Warwick Printing Co. 1995).
46
Text accompanying note 38.
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centives or reason, but can be directly addressed by evoking the
agent's own (perhaps latent) desire for the good. The more one sees
in the search for discernment a creative and generative process, the
more one is willing to trust that there is something within us which
not only seeks to know God's will, but also can contend with that
within which too readily turns us away from that search.
There is a telling understanding of a passage from the Sinai story,
occurring at the very height of the dramatic appearance of God "on
the morning of the third day," in the midst of "thunder and light-
ning, as well as a thick cloud on the mountain, and a blast of a trum-
pet so loud that all the people who were in the camp trembled.,,47 In
most translations, it reads, "As the blast of the trumpet grew louder
and louder, Moses would speak and God would answer him in thun-
der.,,48 Yet, one study Bible notes that this report of "thunder," so fa-
miliar an expression of the way in which God "speaks," may be a mis-
leading translation, for it is "different in form" from the "thunder" of
the earlier passage, "more probably (human) voice.,,49 My teacher,
Rabbi Marcia Prager, unencumbered by four centuries of English
translations and the theology they embody, has no reticence about
rendering the Hebrew as "God answered him with sound," or per-
haps eve~ "with voice," and reports an "extraordinary" Talmudic
teaching."o To their question, "With voice? With sound? With what
voice, what sound?," she writes that the rabbis understood Moses to
hear God speak, "b'kala shel Mashe, with Moshe's own voice! He heard
God's voice as his own voice."S!
The voice within the lawyer, which Jesus evoked, and by which he
was able to take in Jesus's teaching and forget his brittle adversarial
stance, was the gift of God, of his creation as a person. It was God; it
was within him all along, but inaccessible to him and his listeners (all
but one). Recall the miracle of the Burning Bush: s2 The miracle was
not that "the bush was blazing, yet it was not consumed"; the bush
(God's call) is always blazing, it is never consumed. The miracle was
that Moses, though engaged in his daily work "keeping the flock of
his father-in-law," said, "I must turn aside and look at this great sight,
and see why the bush is not burned up." Only then, Scripture re-
counts, "when the Lord saw that he had turned aside to see, God
47 Exodus 19: 16.
48 Exodus 19:19.
49 THE HARPER COLLINS STUDY BIBLE: NEW REVISED STAI'JDARD VERSION, lc-xodus 19:19 & n.19,
at 115 (Wayne A. Meeks et al. eds., 1993).
50 MARCIA PRAGER, THE PATH OF BLESSING: EXPERlE CING THE ENERGY AND ABUNDANCE OF
THE DIVINE 156 (1998).
51 [d.
52 Exod'us 3:2-4.
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called to him out of the bush." Through Jesus's response to the law-
yer's challenge, he "turned aside to see.,,53
The combination of a deep faith in the latent capacity of every
person to "turn aside and see why the bush is not burned up," andJe-
sus's emphasis in the Gospels on the sufficiency of the "love com-
mandments" to ground a moral life, gives rise to the ever-present
danger of a susceptibility to antinomianism. Traditional religion has
responded to this temptation in two related ways: first, as earlier
noted, love does not replace the many rituals, spiritual disciplines,
and behavioral prescriptions of the moral law. 54 Because there is
much to draw us away from that which is within us, we are enjoined to
write it in our hearts as an ongoing, not simply a past, act, to remain
aligned with the terms of our being. "Keep these words that I am
commanding you today in your heart. Recite them to your children,
and talk about them when you are at home, and when you are away,
when you lie down and when you rise.,,55 Within any religious tradi-
tion, its liturgy and rituals can serve to provide a structured and struc-
turing means of serving this function.
Second, both Judaism and Catholicism long ago collectivized the
human capacity for discernment, and found Scriptural warrant for
entrusting it to an elite group. Berke'quotes the Papal Encyclical,
Veritatis Splendor. "[T]he Church's Magisterium also teaches the faith-
ful specific particular precepts and requires that they consider them
in conscience as morally bindinBo,,56 Again, as I understand it, Jewish
teaching is essentially in accord.
53 lowe this understanding of the story of the Burning Bush also to Marcia Prager, and to
my wife, Carolyn Shodt, but recently found a stunning articulation of it by Elizabeth Barrett
Browning:
Earth's crammed with Heaven,
And every common bush afire with God!
But only he who sees, takes off his shoes ....
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Aurora Leigh, as quoted in Tony Bayfield, Partnership in Covenant, in
HE KISSED THEM AND THEY WEPT: TOWARDS ATHEOLOGY OFJEWISH-CATHOLIC PARTNERSHIP 25,
29 (Tony Bayfield et aI. eds., SCM Press, 2001).
54 See supra notes 4-16 and accompanying text; see also Berke, supra note 15, at 239 (stating
that Catholic teaching "never assumes that human affairs can be regulated simply by referring
all of life's decisions to the ultimate principle of love; there are always specific requirements of
right and wrong .... [It] recognizes that people cannot live in an ethical wilderness, between
God and the Devil, without such rules").
55 Deuteronomy 6:5-7.
56 See Berke, supra note 15, at 239 (quoting POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH:
VERITATISSPLENDOR, 'l[ 110, at 133 (1993)).
57 A well-known Talmudic account involving the Mosaic reassurance, "It is not in heaven,"
supra, text accompanying note 32, dramatically asserts that human discernment of the voice of
God is collective, and is entrusted to the sages of Israel as a group, not to any individual. I first
learned the story from a student and have recounted it previously. See ELIZABETH DVORKIN,
JACK HIMMELSTEIN, & HOWARD LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 91-92 (1981) (describing the Talmudic story as assert-
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The tension between the polar hazards of antinomianism and au-
thoritarian legalism remains with us. Across the religious spectrum,
examples abound.s8
IV.
A century-and-a-half ago, Nathaniel Hawthorne described the
Massachusetts Bay Colony of two centuries earlier as "a people
amongst whom religion and law were nearly identical."s9 No one
would say so today, and few would wish it so. Yet, looking not at the
content of the law, but about the way we think about our obligation
toward it, I believe that there remains today a striking parallel be-
tween religious and secular law. One ofJustice Holmes' most-quoted
epigrams describes the nature of (secular) law in these terms: "The
common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the ar-
ticulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identi-
fied .... ,,60 The enduring debate between the positivism of such
thoughts and the natural law tradition61 should not make us lose sight
ing "not only the freedom of humanki'nd 'to interpret and decide,' but an obligation as well to
exercise this freedom, and not to fall back on the supposed authority of Heavenly Voices"). For
a more recent presentation, and an analysis of many interpretative permutations, see David
Luban, The Coiled Serpent of Argument: Reason, Authority, and Law in a Talmudic Tale, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1253 (2004). Suzanne Last Stone presents the broader context of the rabbinic
struggle over the centuries with the question of the source and nature of interpretative author-
ity. Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Tum to the Jewish Legal Model in Con-
temporary American Legal Themy, 106 HARv. L. REv. 813, 851 & n.203 (1993) (asserting, while
complicating the assertion, that " [o]fficial authority to interpret the law is vested in the sages of
each generation").
oM See, e.g., EUJNE PAGELS, BEYOND BELIEF: THE SECRET GOSPEL OF THOivLAS 148 (Vintage
Books 2004) (analyzing the formation of the Christian canon); Robert W. Tuttle, All You Need is
Love: Paul Ramsey's Basic Christian Ethics and the Dilemma of Protestant Antilegalism, 18 j.L. &
RELIGION 427 (2002-03); Haym Soloveitchik, Rupture and Reconstruction: The Transformation of
Contemporary Orthodoxy, 28 TRADITION 64, 69-74 (1994) (describing and analyzing the post-
WWII turn in contemporary Orthodox Judaism towards a greater emphasis on text in interpret-
ing the halakha, at the expense of practice witihin specific communities). Reconstructionist
Judaism, which is founded on the principle that "the past has a vote but not a veto," has strug-
gled to find a significant role for individual conscientious discernment, while not simply legiti-
mating selfjustifying rationalizations for departures from the teaching of the tradition. See Re-
becca Alpert & Jacob Staub, EXPLORlNG JUDAISM: A RECONSTRUCTION1ST APPROACH ch. 4
(1988) (presenting a Reconstructionist approach to observance of the dietary laws and the
scope of permissible grounds for abortion).
,9 NATHANIEL HA\-YTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 41 (Sculley Bradley et al. eds., W.W. Nor-
ton & Co. 2d ed. 1978) (1868).
fiO S. Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes,j., dissenting).
61 The natural law tradition asserts that "human law is in some sense derived from moral
norms that are universally valid and discoverable by reasoning about human nature or true
human goods." Kent Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1,8 (1985).
It rejects the view that law is no more than the command of one with recognized political
power, simply posited by the sovereign (hence "positivism"). A classic statement of the positivist
position is by Justice Holmes: "[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man
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of a salient commonality: both a "brooding omnipresence" and a
"sovereign or quasi-sovereign" are often characterized by an entire
otherness. They arise from outside us and constrain our choices.
This view, it has been observed, is reflected in both religion and law:
In the Western theological tradition, God is lawgiver, as well as enforcer,
of a legal and/or moral code. Western political tradition mimics this
concept of deity.... The Bible assumes that God and God's demands ex-
isted prior to creation .... The government is based on a system of law
that develops a significance independent of its creators and obligates its
citizens. The legal system, although open to influence, functions as an
institution apart from the citizens, just as a transcendent God is open to
supplication and grayer, but is ultimately separate from the creatures
who were created.
The human actor is primarily understood as having been told his or
her obligations, whether by text, tradition, or reason. Hearing the
authoritative voice may be a simple matter, it may require sustained
and penetrating attention: the actor is in either case discovering what
is required.
This is not the place even to catalogue the many manifestations of
this consciousness in secular law. It dominates most approaches to
such subjects as statut0D' interpretation63• and judicial control of ad-
ministrative discretion. It is also exhibited in the ubiquitous
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this way or that way ...." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 458 (1897). Within the natmallaw
camp, there is disagreement over its relation to belief in God.
6. FREDELLE ZAIMAN SPIEGEL, WOMEN'S WAGES, WOMEN'S WORTH: POLITICS, RELIGION, AND
EQUIlY 133 (1994).
63 Normative theories typically accept the essential premise of legislative supremacy: a stat·
ute is a "command" of the legislature, which courts and agencies are obligated to carry out reo
gardless of their view of the justice of such a result. Despite the contested character of theories
of statutory interpretation, that is, of the way in which the content of that command is dis·
cerned, the major competitors-commonly termed intentionalism, textualism, and purposiv-
ism-have in common a quality especially salient for present purposes: they judge an interpre-
tation according to its accuracy in following the Legislature's directive, whether manifested in
its perceived intention (intentionalism), the meaning of its chosen words (textualism), or its
relevant attributed policy objectives (purposivism).
Contrast the "hermeneutic" model, which asserts that "statutory meaning is constructed, not
discovered, by the interpreter," WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,jR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
62 (Harvard University 'Press 1994), and that "the text lacks meaning until it is interpreted."
William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statut01y Interpretation as Pmctical Reasoning, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 321, 346 (1990). This view would legitimate, as with varying degrees of emphasis the
others would not, the "creative supplementing of the law" through the process of making the
statute "concrete in each specific case." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION 802 (West 3d ed. 2001). .
64 At first blush, the landmark decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natuml Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), appears to establish a counter-example, insulating from judi-
cial oversight agency discretion to decide questions of law to which Congress has not "directly
spoken." Id. at 842. However, the ground of the decision seems to be a desire to preclude
courts from giving meaning to ambiguous terms in a statute-filling "any gap left, implicitly or
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grounding of legislation in instrumental rationality; influencing the
conduct of those addressed by the law is typically conceived of as the
application of incentives, positive or negative, that operate through
their effect on individual calculation of advantage.65
In a consciousness that is seriously relational, the process of fol-
lowing moral norms becomes as much a matter of assuming responsibil-
ityas of practicing obedience. H. Richard Niebuhr's classic study of
The Responsible Selfexpresses the thought in these words:
Israel is the people that is to see and understand the action of God in
everything that happens and to make a fitting reply. So it is in the New
Testament also. The God to whom Jesus points is not the commander
who gives laws but the doer of small and of mighty deeds, the creator of
sparrows and clother of lilies, the ultimate giver of blindness and of sight,
the ruler whose rule is hidden in the manifold activities of plural agen-
cies but is yet in a way visible to those who know how to interpret the
. f h' 66sIgns 0 t e tImes.
Responsibility has in common with obedience the quality of a re-
quired response: an admonition may not simply be shrugged off. But
the responsible response is far more textured than the simply obedi-
ent; judgment, insight, creativity, a wise discretion-in short, wis-
dom-play as much of a role as conformity to rule.
The function of the law in this consciousness is to a significant de-
gree to facilitate as well as to induce or coerce-to facilitate, not only
in the sense of creating an incentive grounded in self-interest, but
also to remove impediments to an internally generated recognition of
responsibility. This concept is not some lessened sense of obligation,
a soft means of avoidance. Indeed, keeping the law written in our
explicitly, by Congress," Id. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974), by decid-
ing which reading best comports with the statute's ascribed purposes. Agencies are permitted to
choose among permissible meanings because they are politically accountable; "federal judges-
who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who
do." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. See Justice Scalia's justification of the decision as preferring, and
believing Congress to prefer, that "the ambiguities it creates, intentionally or unintentionally,
will be resolved ... not by the courts but by a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily
be known." Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
LJ. 511,517 (emphasis added). The exercise of wise judgment, guided but only partially chan-
neled by legislative responses, is regarded as too close to the domain of "politics" to be accepted
as part of "law."
65 A focus on incentives, at the same time as it minimizes a creative human role in law-
application, maximizes human choice of response to law in a manner that threatens to cabin its
moral dimension. Rather than reason serving (as it does in the natural law tradition) as a
means of discovering one's obligation, in a positivist consciousness reasO:1 can become "rational
profit-maximizing," aiding the actor in choosing freely whether to obey the law or to risk a sanc-
tion, with no preemptive force given to a moral imperative discernable in it. For a comprehen-
sive and careful description and critique of the growing espousal of this view, see Cynthia A.
Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era ofEfficiency, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1265 (1998).
66 H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF: AN ESSAY IN CHRISTIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
67 (1963).
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hearts can be more demanding than a rote obedience, can mean
more than following the rules wholeheartedly, for it presumes fidelity
to a moral norm that may be only partially expressed.57 It entails act-
ing as a co-creator of the law by which we are governed, giving it
meaning in myriad applications by bringing to bear the qualities of
moral imagination with which we are equipped.68 A question like,
"Who is my neighbor?" no longer seems so plainly dispositive. 69
I believe that a major prop of the widespread reluctance to view
the idea of assuming responsibility as sufficiently "law-abiding" is the
difficulty it presents in judging whether an agent has met the norm in
question. Responsibility is normally imposed on people, not assumed
by them, in religion as well as in law. Marcus Borg has vividly de-
scribed the "conventional wisdom" of traditional religion in terms
that resonate graphically with this characteristic of law. He speaks of
"the Christian life" in this paradigm as a "[l]ife ... of requirement,"
"a world ofjudgment," and "anxious striving.,,70
To move the role of passing judgment off center stage is not to
remove it entirely, but to refuse to allow the desire to facilitate judg-
ing questions of compliance to play so primary a shaping role in de-
scribing what is rightful conduct. The ready assumption that the law
exists to coerce people into acting as tliey should, or to punish those
who do not, needs to be leavened with the recognition that the moral
law "is" in our hearts. It is not a "Pollyanna-like" mindset to insist on
keeping in the forefront of our minds that most people have within
67 Miriam Starhawk, a practitioner and expositor of Goddess religion, writes of the obliga-
tion to act justly, "not as a written code or set of rules imposed from without. Instead,justice is
an inner sense that each act brings about consequences that must be faced responsibly."
Miriam Simes Starhawk, Ethics and Justice in Goddess Religion, in THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S
SPIRITUALIW: ESSAYS ON THE RISE OF SPIRITUAL POWER WITHIN THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT 415,
418 (Charlene Spretnak ed., Anchor Books 1982).
68 For a helpful discussion of the ethic of responsibility, see ALBERT R. JONSEN,
REsPONSIBILIW IN MODERN RELIGIOUS ETHICS 173-228 (1968).
09 In a study of surpassing subtlety and insight, Emily Hartigan has found in a group of state
court decisions applying their constitutions to issues of local government and property an un-
derstanding of the fundamental law as jurisprudentially preceding and under-girding its textual
expression. Emily Fowler Hartigan, Law and Mystery: Calling the Letter to Life Through the Spirit of
the Law of State Constitutions, 6].L. & RELIGION 225 (1988). She writes that "order, law, public
formation, cannot merely be imposed," id. at 261 (quoting MURRAY BODO, JUNIPER: FRIE D OF
FRANCIS, FOOL OF GOD (St. Anthony Messenger Press 1983)), and sets forth an "interpretive
cast" of constitutional justification that "has put into words more of the inchoate level of law,"
id. at 258, which she describes as:
drawing into words and voicing into tradition, wisdom from the underlying (or overarch-
ing) fund of human pre-knowledge. This is the idea of constitutionality "from time im-
memorial," of fundamental law that was known in the human heart before Magna
Carta ... which we are ever struggling to bring into being.
Id. at 258.
70 MARCUS]' BORG, MEETINGJESUS AGAIN FOR THE FIRST TIME: THE HISTORICALJESUS & THE
HEART OF CONTEMPORARY FAITH 75-80 (1994).
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Douglas Sturm has described dialogue as an "interaction" whereby
a participant "enters into the life of the other" in a manner that at
times entails "hard-headed confrontation and opposition."74 I find in
71 An example is the contested question of how relatives of seriously ill people should be
encouraged by law to provide necessary high-tech care at home for them, when care in hospitals
and other facilities is not available. See Nel Noddings, Moral Obligation or Moral Support for High-
Tech Home Care?, HAsTINGS CENTER REp., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at S6 (critiquing approaches based on
assertions of obligation); LESNICK, LISTENING FOR GOD, supra note 20, at 140-41 (critiquing
Noddings' position as excessively polarized).
72 In a penetrating study of the "transform[ation of] the conservative legal agenda," David
Super has noted that a group of social conservatives whom he terms the "new moralizers" "have
coupled rhetoric about individual responsibility with per se rules that deny individualized de-
terminations";
Although this rigid approach ... departs from the largely individualized concepl of mo-
rality that the new moralizers have advanced, it is quite consistent with their binary con-
cept of morality. If the world is divided between "good" and "bad" people, the search for
redeeming characteristics in the latter is ultimately a fool's errand.
David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transfonning the Conservative Legal Agenda, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 2032, 2074 (2004).
73 See supra note 1.
74 DOUGLAS STURM, SOLIDARITY AND SUFFERING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF RATIONALITY 183-84
(SUNY Press 1998).
them the desire to act rightfully, residing alongside often-powerful .~
contrary influences, which arise from within their personalities and :'
from outside as well. We see the function and the possibilities of le-
gal regulation more broadly when we act on that dual recognition.
When we do, we turn toward a legal response that acknowledges a
public responsibility to ease some of the very real barriers to acting
on the inward desire to do what is right. Weakness of will and just'~
plain wrong-headedness and immorality can be constrained by the i
power of the law where it need be, while yet recognizing the distorted
character of such a response as a total one.71 The first response of the
law should be to act to remove or lessen the force of impediments ex-
isting in people's private and social lives that limit their capacity and
willingness to act consistently with it.
The spirit that is simply not interested in helping "sinners" to be- i
come better people, which characterizes so many political initiatives "I
today, is based on an understanding of the world that views the law as
I"written on the hearts" only of the elect, however defined, and the '
rest be damned.
72
There is much in the religious tradition that mani- 1",1\:
fests and legitimates such an outlook. There is, however, no less that
reflects and supports a very different view, not least among them j
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Luke's story much to teach us about dialogue. I will comment briefly
on a few themes; there may well be others.
First, although the "other" in the story was a co-religionist, the
case one of intrareligious rather than interreligious dialogue, it is no
less relevant. To me, the differences that exist within a religion, how-
ever we identify its parameters, are often more salient than those ex-
isting between one religion and another. That is so because I tend not
to understand the classic denominational matters of belief, ritual, or
in some cases even life practices, primarily as propositional assertions
regarding the nature of reality. I rather view as more central to the
essence of religious belief such enduring questions as the necessity
and sufficiency of obeying the arr~y of behavioral norms of one's
faith tradition for living a moral life. I~ As I understand him, as I imag-
ine or reconstruct his outlook from the few words he spoke, the law-
yer believed in, and set out in "testing" Jesus to demonstrate, the
vacuousness of reliance on the "love commandments" to constitute
compliance with the Divine Will. When people of different religions
(or different branches of a religion) hold differing views on that
question, it is easy to attribute their differences in that regard to their
particular faith commitments. But a. version of the question exists
within every religion of which I am aware.
Second, while the idea of interreligious dialogue often conjures
up exchanges among large, at times very large, groups of people,
here we have almost the polar setting. It was not, to be sure, a private
conversation, for Jesus was probably interested in teaching something
to the disciples present, and the lawyer may have been seeking to
score a point with them.
76
Jesus's primary "audience," however, was
the man to whom he was speaking; he is presented as talking to him
rather than about his ideas. For most of us, however, the presence of
a group of the like-minded is an obstacle to our observing that requi-
site of genuine dialogue.
75 A view like mine is of course highly contestable. For examples of approaches that under-
stand the differences between religions primarily in terms of their differing "truth claims" about
the nature of reality, and which therefore find interreligious differences decisive, see PAUL]'
GRIFFITHS, AN APOLOGY FOR APOLOGETICS: A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF INTERRELIGIOUS
DIALOGUE 1-18 (Orbis Books 1991); PAUL]' GRIFFITHS, PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
(Blackwell 2001); JOHN F. MAcARTHUR, RECKLESS FAITH: WHEN THE CHURCH LOSES ITS WILL TO
DISCERN 38-44 (Crossway Books 1994); HAROLD A. NETLAND, DISSONAJ"lT VOICES: RELIGIOUS
PLURALISM AND THE QUESTION OF TRUTH 112-150 (Apollos 1991).
-G
, The text does not make clear the extent of the presence of others, but it suggests the
presence of the seventy disciples. The Chapter in which the story appears begins \'lith the ac-
count of the appointment, commission, and return of the disciples. Luke 10:1-24. The lawyer's
intervention follows just then. Luke 10:25. After the story's conclusion, "as they went" and ar-
rived at "a certain village," the text turns to the incident involving Martha and Mary. Luke
10:38-42.
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The interaction, though spare, has a most instructive content. Je-
sus went beyond refraining from attacking the lawyer for his motives
or arguing the inadequacy of his premises. He sought to affect the
lawyer's thinking by prompting him to experience inwardI!, the limi-
tations of his approach, such that he "fell into perplexity."7 The ten-
sion within the lawyer-between the logical grounding and thrust of
the lawyer's question, "Who is my neighbor?," and the emotional pull
of his empathic response to the Parable-complicated the lawyer's
grasp of the process of giving meaning to a term in a moral admoni-
tion. The quiet response, "The one who showed him mercy," was elo-
quent in its receptivity. At this shift in the lawyer's affect, the possibil-
ity of "hard-headed confrontation," foreshadowed by the story's
opening line, evaporated, and Jesus could now complete his response
to the lawyer's original question: "Go and do likewise."
The awakening of empathy is a source of moral knowledge. To be
a genuine dialogue partner, I must struggle to leaven my cognitive
reasons for rejecting or disapproving of the position of the "other"
with a meaningful attempt at an empathic understanding of its
grounding. I cannot, for example, simply condemn as triumphalists
or vestigial colonialists evangelical ~hristianswho do not merely wit-
ness to their faith, but whose missionary activities consist of peaceful
attempts to convert non-believers, without fully taking in the fact that
they believe that, in doing so, they are carrying out an explicit, au-
thoritative and binding expression of the Will of God. 78 My reaction
to triumphalism is by no means benign, however,79 and a venture into
dialogue would require me genuinely to move condemnation off cen-
ter stage. Were I to accomplish such a shift, I would not necessarily
change my view but would more readily acknowledge the partiality of
my own outlook, and the "mystery" of a moral template that is richer
than both my own and that of my dialogue partner or opponent.80
If I would seek to affect another's outlook through dialogue, I
would do well to seek methods of doing so that rest on engaging his
or her capacities for empathy rather than to argue the validity of the
premises or reasoning on which that outlook is based. So, I believe
that one who finds in his or her religion grounds for opposing equal
treatment in law for homosexual people would more likely come to
question that view as a result of getting to know such people, and
their lives, than by hearing a rebuttal of the meaning or binding force
77 PLATO, Meno *84c, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 870, 884 (John M. Cooper ed., Hackett
1997); see also id. at *84b (" [F] or now, as he does not know, he would be glad to find out ....").
78 This is the "Great Commission": "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them
in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." Matthew 28:19.
79 See LESNICK, LISTENING FOR GOD, supra note 20, at 59-60: "My effort in this book is to pre-
sent a religious consciuousness that succeeds in divesting itself of the tIiumphalist legacy."
80 lowe this realization to my daughter, Alice Lesnick.
of the scriptural bases of their views.8) Once such an engagement of
empathy has occurred, one will perhaps be more open to a direct en-
gagement with a reading of Scripture that draws in question the claim
of divine condemnation of all homosexual sex.82 To dispute interpre-
tations of Scripture, or the teaching of a religious tradition that one
has long followed, may succeed in setting up existential tensions in
the hearer,83 but the awakening of empathy for those injured by one's
understanding of divine law enables the person holding such an un-
81 See Claudia A. Lewis, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Mar-
riage, 97 YALE LJ. 1783 (1988) (attempting to evoke such empathy simply by telling a story).
The opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the "gay marriage" decision, Good-
ridge v. Department ofPublic Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), contains an example of such an
approach. As a prelude to, and a context for, considering the constitutional questions pre-
sented, the opening paragraphs of the opinion for the Court present the facts of the plaintiffs'
circumstances in a manner that silently but eloquently draws in question the accuracy of widely
held hostile perceptions of the lives of gay couples. See id. at 949 (describing the plaintiffs' long-
term, benign relationships with each other and their communities).
82 See WALTER WINK, Homosexuality and the Bible, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND CHRISTIAN FAJTH:
QUESTIONS OF CONSCIENCE FOR THE CHURCHES 33, 33-49 (Walter Wink ed., Fortress 1999)
(presenting an example of such an engagement).
83 Catholic analytic philosopher Paul Griffiths maintaiQs that his assent to "most of the
teachings of [his] religion" is, by and large, an involuntary matter. As to each such teaching:
[T]here is a long (and usually complicated) story to be told about why I find myself in-
voluntarily moved to assent to these claims at a particular time. Usually, that story will
involve reference to habits, skills, and knowledge I've gained in the past, but in all cases
the upshot is the same: I find myself irresistibly moved to assent .... I cannot deliberate
and then decide whether to believe it or not. When I find myself assenting to some
claim (believing it, taking it as true), then, my assent typically does not involve choice or
deliberation. It is simply given to me.
GRIFFITHS, PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, supra note 75, at 26. Inferentially, Griffiths is
speaking about the convictions of many other religious people as well as himself.
It is important to recognize that the truth of such an admission does not imply that one's be-
liefs are not true, see Alvin Plantinga, Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism, in THE
RATIONALITY OF BELIEF AND THE PLURALITY OF FAITH 191, 211-12 (Thomas D. Senor ed., Cor-
nell 1995), although the admission might-and perhaps should-"call into question, to some
degree or other, the sources" of such beliefs. Id. at 214-15.
Opposition to equality claims of gay and lesbian people often does not avowedly rest on reli-
gious "sources." For well-known attempts by two leading moral philosophers, both Roman
Catholics, to ground their condemnation of homosexual sex on secular premises, see John M.
Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation, "69 NOTRE DANlE L. REv. 1049 (1994); Robert P.
George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 YAI.E LJ. 2475 (1977).
However, their arguments condemn homosexual sex on principles that would also render illicit
masturbation, contraception, and intra-marital sodomy, and, though cast in secular terms, map
precisely onto the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church with respect to those practices. See
CATECHISM OFTHE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 'l!'lI 2352,2357,2370 (Doubleday 1995). For a careful,
thorough, rigorous, and to me wholly dispositive demonstration of the incoherence of the posi-
tion they put forth, see Michael l Perry, The Morality ofHomosexual Conduct: A Response toJohn
Finnis, 9 NOTRE DAMElL. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 41 (1995). See also Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v.
Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 373, 385 n.47 (1997) (noting the "very striking
breadth" of the ground of Finnis's attempt to "articulate a basis in natural reason, apart from
biblical condemnation and Christian theology, why homosexual relationships might be treated
by the law as immoral," and summarily characterizing as "indefensib[le]" what he describes as
"this accomplished philosopher's best effort to justify [the condemnation] in secular terms").
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derstanding to deal with those tensions from within, as did the lawyer
in Luke's story. Whatever the outcome, it will be that person's own,
not simply a response to a check in a chess game.81
84 Amy Uelmen has written a careful, sensitive, and penetrating call for genuine dialogue
about an especially vexing source of intra-religious discord. See Amelia]. Uelmen, The Spiritual-
ity of Communion: A Resource for Dialogue with Catholics in Public Life, 43 CATH. LAw. 289 (2004).
Fully embracing the Papal pronouncement that abortion constitutes a grave moral disorder, she
maintains that "a spirituality of communion .... [a]t the very least ... is an invitation to genu-
inely listen to the concerns of Catholics in public life as 'those who are a part of me,' taking on
their burdens, and understanding their struggles." Id. at 305; see also id. at 305-08 (discussing
"the spirituality of communion and political commitment").
